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1. Illtroduction 
Our point of departure is the observation that standard real business cycle (RBC) 
models perfonn poorIy in lllimicking the statistical properties of labor market fiuctuations, 
factor share cyclical behavior, and the comovements between capital income share and 
investment variations. These are not particularIy new remarks. Beginning with Summers 
(1986), a nwnber of different authors have either dismissed RBC models because of this 
feature or tried to amend them. 1 
VVhile investigators have maintained very different Opll1l0nS about the appropriate 
framework capable of modelling the labor market 's cyclical oscillations, there seems to 
be wide aggreelllent on the stylized facts and on their inconsistency with the marginal 
productivity and intertelllporal substitution lllodels of the labor lllarket. 
Observed real wages are too smooth and estimated intertelllporal labor supply elas­
ticites too low to justify the observecl volatility in hours. If (as the RBC moclels assullle) 
emploYlllent anc1 real wages are generateel mainly by the impaet of labor demanc1 shocks 
on a competitive labor market, then the elata should lie close to a dynamic labor supply 
function. If this supply funetion is ine1astic, the variations in real wages shoulc1 be larger 
than the variations in emploYlllent. Reality is orthogonal to the ll10del's prec1ictions. 
Table 1 in the next page illustrates S0ll1e features of the post-sec.onel worlel war perioel 
for the U.S. econ0ll1Y. Vv'e have reportec1 sall1ple statistics on standard deviations, output 
correlations, ancl unconelitional first autocorrelations for H-P filtered data. While the 
adoption of different stationarity-inducing methods seell1S to affect the output-correlation 
ancI autocorrelation properties of certain time series, it is beyond the scope of this papel' 
to aeldress these differences. Since H-P filtering is the ll1ethoel most often useel to induce 
stationarity in the RBC literature we report a11 statistics based on H-P filtereel elata. 
'Where applicable, we note differences in results obtaineel froll1 alternate methods: log­
linear detrending and log first-differencing. 
A few "faets" stanel out quite clearly. Real wages exhibit a weak correlation with 
output and about half its volatility. Salllple estilllates also show that while in the long-run 
1 To name but just a few of the latter: Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990), Benhabib, Rogerson 
and Wright (1991), Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1993), Christiano and 
Eichenbaum (1990), Danthine and Donaldson (1992), Gomme and Greenwood (1993), Hansen (1985), Rogerson 
(1988), Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Wright (1988). 
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wages and labor productivity may display a high degree of conformity, they do not exhibit 
much of a coherent relationship at business cycle frequencies. Furthermore real wages are 
highly persistent, a property which is not shared by the real wage time-series generated by 
the standard RBC model. 
Indeed, a high autocorrelation level is displayed by most aggregate variables in log 
first-differences as well (not reported in Table 1). 
This is a crucial property of real business cycles which is seriously missed by standard 
RBC models. 
Table 1 - Quarterly V.S. Data (1947:1-1990:4) 
Series Sto D. Corro Autocorr. 
Output 2.24 1.00 .847 
Consumption 0.86 0.75 .817 
Investment 4.40 0.81 .806 
Hours 1.88 0.88 .887 
Avg. Lab. Prod. 1.06 0.55 .680 
Real Wage 0.77 0.33 .684 
Labor Share 1.08 -0.32 .723 
Profits 10.49 0.81 .786 
SI. D: Sample standard deviation of variables. Corr: Sample correlation with output. Autocorr: Sample uncondi· 
tional first autocorrelation. Statistics are based on time series that have been filtered with the Hodrick.Prescott filter to 
assure stationarity. The HP Filter was computed for lambda = 1600. 
Labor hours (and employment as well) are strongly procyclical and substantially more 
volatile than wages. In fact, depending on sample subperiods, they may display even wider 
oscillations than output itself. The very high elasticity of the dynamic labor supply curve 
"implied" by the aggregate data is at odds with most microeconomic evidence on labor 
supply behavior and is the crucial reason for the rejection of the intertemporal substitution 
model (Altonji and Ashenfelter (1980) and Altonji (1982) contain the seminal empirical 
work in this direction). 
Analysis of micro-level data (as reported for example in Beaudry and DeNardo (1991) 
and Bils (1991)) also reveal that wages depend on labor market conditions at the time 
~"""-'---------'-----,-------,---------------------'.... 
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workers are hired and that real wages are quite sensitive to variations in the unemployment 
rates that occurr during the job-tenure periodo 
Finally it has long been observed that a high degree oí coherence exhists between 
most measures oí profits and investment activity with the íormer somewhat leading the 
latter, (Zarnowitz (1992, chapt. 2)). Profits typically spring up at the early stage oí a 
recovery led by strong gains in labor productivity which are not matched by raises in real 
wages. On the other hand, profits tend to decline in the later stages oí an expansion as 
costs start rising íaster than revenues, reducing profit margins. This is oíten accompanied 
or even caused by a tightening oí labor market conditions which pushes up labor costs, 
cuts down profits and as a consequence leads to a reduction oí investment activity, (again 
see Zarnowitz (1992) íor a detailed anaIysis). 
It is our belieí that some oí these íacts can be accounted íor by removing the Walrasian 
market clearing mechanism írom the labor market and by replacing it with an explicit 
model oí labor relations. In this paper we begin to do so by assuming that eontraetual 
arrangements allocate labor resources in a manner that exploits the gains írom trade that 
result írom workers difficulty in shedding cyclical income risk and entrepreneurs (assumed) 
higher tolerance íor such risk. The theoretieal underpinnings oí this approach go back to 
the seminal works oí Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974). which were based on the idea that 
labor markets embody an insurance aspect where labor's claims on output are partially 
fixed prior to the realization oí output while entrepreneurs bear a disproportionate share 
oí the output uncertainty. 
In exchange íor the this provision oí income insurance to workers, entrepreneurs gain a 
more flexible labor supply. As stated with great clarity in Showen (1985) "Contractual in­
come transíers smooth consumption, which interacts with labor utilization by eliminating 
income effeets. The prolllinence oí substitution effects promotes an elastic labor utilization 
response to socially diversifiable external shocks. Contraet,~ tend to increa,~e the volatility 
oi employment ... " Consequently, an interpretation oí the present work that we wish to 
'stress is that it allows íor significant observable intertemporal substitution, consistent with 
the empirical evidence in Hall (1988), even when parallleterization oí workers' intratem­
poral labor supply elasticity (elasticity oí substitution between consumption and leisure) 
is constrained by the available microeconomic evidence. 
This approach is based on the joint hypotheses: that employees are more risk averse 
than employers and that they cannot access financiallllarkets to independently achieve in­
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tertemporal consumption smoothing to the extent that the latter can. The first hypothesis 
is somewhat arbitrary, at least on strict empirical grounds. While there are we11 known 
theoretical justifications for its adoption (from Knight (1921) to Kihlstrom and Laffont 
(1983)) we lack hard empirical evidence to be used either against 01' in favor. In our 
research we have chosen to fix the entrepreneurs' risk aversion and to treat the workers' 
risk aversion as a "free parameter". The validity of this method can only be judged by 
the power of its predictions and by the extent to which "unreasonable" differences in risk 
aversion are needed to deliver interesting results. The numerical simulations presented in 
section 3 show we need relatively small differences in risk aversion to aceount for most of 
the empirical regularities we claim to explain. 
The seeond hypothesis seems easier to defend. An almost endless array of studies on 
the distribution of wealth show a strong concentration in the upper tail of the population 
(e.g. Atkinson (1983), Champernowne and Cowell (1990), Cowe11 (1984), Smith (1980)). 
This is particularly true for financial wealth and for the ownership of equities. If 
one excludes pension funds (which are seldom if ever used to achieve cyclical consumption 
smoothing) the percentage of individuals who own and actively trade financial instruments 
in organized seeurity markets is remarkably sma11. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), for example, 
report strong evidence that no more thall 25% of the householcls engage in these type of 
activities. More important for our concerns is the fact that similar figures emerge from 
the literature on eonsumption smoothing and market ineompleteness. For example, using 
aggregate data, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) find that an approximate 50-50 split oceurs 
between households that satisfy the permanent income hypothesis ancI households that 
are eonstrained in their cyclical borrowing-lending possibilities. Results on miero-leve! 
data are more conservative. The cummulation of evidence presented in Hall and Mishkin 
(1982), Mariger (1986), Hubbard ancI Judd (1986), and Jape11i (1990) suggest a consensus 
view that 20% of U.S. families are liquidity constrained and behave in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the pure life-cycle model. 
Furthermore, daily observations suggest that a large portion of actual investment 
decisions is eoncentrated in the hallds of a sma11 fraction of agents. While this may be 
the outcome of some complicated arrangement solving an eeonomy-wide principal-agellt 
problem, we seriously doubt the realism of such an interpretatioll. It seems simpler alld 
more realistic to assume that the few agents taking responsibility for investment decisions 
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are providing insurance services to the remaining portion of the households, not by trading 
assets that the latter effectively own, but through the employment relation. 
In the model below two types of individuals meet in each period: workers (proletarians) 
and entrepreneurs (capitalists). Before uncertainty is realized the latter offer to the former 
a contract specifying the hours of work and the total payment they will receive in each 
possible future state of the world. Once the contract is mutual1y agreed upon, both agents 
wilI stick to it, thereby asswning away the ex-post recontracting and enforceability issues 
arising in the optimal contract literature (see Hart and Holmstrom (1987) for a recent 
survey and discussion). 
The workers consume in each period al1 of their wage payments, whereas the en­
trepreneur (who also supplies a portion of the total work efi'ort) acts like the usual infinitely 
lived intertemporal maximizing representative agent. Capital accumulation decisions, iú 
particular, are still modeleel along the lines of Brock-Mirman (1972) as implemented in the 
RBC traelition of Kydland anel Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983). 
A typical cycle in our model consists of the fol1owing stages. Begin near the end of a 
recession period, when the economy has been hit by a sequence of negative shocks. Before 
the positive shock is realized, workers expected utility from selling their time on tomorrow's 
spot market is low. This induces a low reservation utility and, consequently, a cOlltract 
specifying a wage-Iabor combination which fixes the wage in future gooel states wel1 be­
low the marginal proeluctivity of labor. Vvhen a positive shock is realized, entrepreneurs 
reap most of the benefits from the higher labor productivity. The cOlltract also specifies 
a relatively high supply of labor in gooel states alld these two things jointly boost profits 
anel therefore investmellts. As labor proeluctivity increases so does workers reservation 
utility thereby affording them a stronger bargaining position. This generates contracts 
more favorable to workers that progressively erode profit margins, illcrease their own con­
sumption and, as the recovery progresses, also reduce the incentive to invest in physical 
capital. At the end of the boom contracts refiect the t,ight labor market conditions amI, 
when a negative shock arrives, will magnify its impact on the firms' profitability. In turn 
this induces a sharp decline in profits and investments near the peak of the cycle when the 
contraction oecurs. 
It is important to stress that the introduction of a labor contract does not alter only 
the cyclical pattern of wages and hours but has an impact also on the way in which 
investments, profits anel the labor-share respond to the exogenous shocks. Basical1y the 
"------------------------------------------_.--------­
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elllployees "lend" to the employers in good periods and "borrow" frolll them in bad ones. 
This increases the oscillations of profits which now bear a much larger portion of the shock 
in productivity. It also increases their correlation with output and it should tend to create 
a negative correlation between labor share and output. Furtherlllore profits are now the 
crucial source of funds for the new capital, hence one expects the volatility of investments 
to increase as well, which it does. 
There have recently been other attempts to elllploy risk-sharing arguments in models 
seeking to explain macroeconomic fluctuations, most noticeably Danthine and Donaldson 
(1992) and GOlllme and Greenwood (1993). A comparison between our methodology and 
those acloptecl by these authors is therefore appropriate. 
The Danthine ancl Donalclson moclel is quite clifferent from the one we use. Leisure 
cloes not enter utility functions ancl workers are divicled into two groups (young ancl olcl) 
with the second only being covered by a contracto The latter guarantees full employment 
to the olcl people while the young enter ancl exit the employment relation acc.orcling to 
vValrasian clemancl but have their income protectecl through a minimum wage ancl unem­
ploYlllent compensation finaneecl by a tax on profits. It is therefore unclear what is the 
role playecl by the labor eontraet in generating the moclel's high volatility of labor as the 
latter eomes all from the young portion of the population. AIso it is unclear if workers' 
reservation utility vary along the eycle, 01' is insteacl specified once ancl for all at the be­
ginning of time. Danthine ancl Donalclson are succesfull in mimicking observecl volatility 
in hours. On the other hancl they clo not report wages, profits ancl factor shares so one 
eannot evaluate their moclel's performanees along those climensions. 
The moclel stucliecl by GOl1lme ancl Greenwoocl is closer to ours. The clescription of 
the eeonOl1lY, of its technology ancl population are quite similar. Differently from us they 
specify preferences with an endogenously til1le-varying ancl agent specific discount factor, 
whose illlpact on the equilibriul1l clynamics is harcl to disentangle from that of the risk­
sharing arrangement. A seconcl, more relevant, difference is their treatment of the labor 
contraet. Workers ancl entrepreneurs are both allowed to slllooth c.onsumption by holding 
financial seeurities in a complete market environment. The alllount of borrowing-Iending 
that employees carry out through securities is then included in the wage bill together 
with the usual marginal productivity payment. Consequent1y the optimal contract is not 
stucliecl directly ancl there is no enclogenous deterlllination of the two parties' bargaining 
strength. More to the eentral point, following along the icleas of Wright (1988), GOlllme and 
...........------------------------r-------------------­
7 
Greenwood methodology assumes that the introduction of labor contracts will only change 
observed factor payments but will have no impact on the real allocations. The present 
papel' is based on the opposite assumption, Le. that the non-walrasian features of labor 
markets affec.t not only the denomination of factors' payments but also the intertemporal 
behavior of most aggregate variables. 
The papel' is articulated in three other sections. The next one describes the the­
oretical model and briefiy examines the qualitative intuitions underlying our approach. 
Here we spend some time discussing possible alternative formulations of the contractual 
enviromnent which give rise to different levels of bargaining power and relatively different 
allocations of cyclical risk. Sec.tion three specifies the adopted functional forms, derives 
the equilibrium relations and illustrates the outcomes of our simulations. In each case 
sample statistics are reported and compared to the relevant ones for the U.S. data during 
the post-war periodo Section 4 concludes the papel' and discusses some of the issues which 
are still left open. 
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2. The Theoretical Framework. 
We study the following environlllent. There are two kinds of infinitely lived agents: 
those that own SOllle stock of capital and those that don't. For each type a continuUlll of 
identical individuals is presento We assume there are m ~ 1 proletarians for each capitalist. 
Individuals of type 1 are bom without any stock of capital and are more risk averse than 
their type 2 capitalist counterpart. People that are not shareholders are prevented from 
accessing capital markets to borrow/lend out of their labor income. This constrains their 
eonsumption and wage payments to coincide in each periodo 
Capitalists instead can borrow and lend at will in a perfect1y competitive capital 
market. In each period, after observing a realization of the technology shock St, they 
organize the production process, pay the workers and retain the residual output to be 
either consulllec1 or investec1 in future capital stock. 
There also exists a cOlllpetitive market for 8 periods ahead labor contracts (8 ~ 1 
with 8 an integer) where, at the enc1 of each period, shareholders hire a fraction 1/8 of 
next perioc1's employees by offering thelll a lllenu {W(S),L(S)}SES ofpossible salaries (or 
wage bills) anc1 hours ofwork. A c1ifferent pair (W(S),L(S)) is associatec1 to each possible 
realization S E S of the technology shock. These eontracts are assullled to be perfectly 
enforceable at no observable cost to either party. 
The proc1uction function is written as 
where L t is the labor supply of proletarians amI N t is the labor supply of the stockholc1ers. 
The function F is standard: hOlllogenoeul'> of degree one, concave, monotone increasing 
anc1 smooth al'> neec1ec1. The technology shock St follows a stationary Markov process 
summarizec1 by the transition function P(S, S') with compact state space S. Denote with 
K the real interval of feasible values of the capital stock. 
Utility functions are denoted with v(e, T - L) for agent 1 and u(c, T - N) for agent 2. 
We want to assume that agent 1 is more averse to consulllption risk than agent 2, which 
means 
-vll(e,T-L)e -ull(c,T-N)c 
Vl (e, T - L) > Ul (c, T - N) 
for e= c and N = L. The common intertemporal discount factor is denoted by 6 E (0,1). 
-------------------------,----------------------­
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2.1 Equilibrium without Contracts. 
To compute the proletarians' reservation utility when bargaining over the labor con­
tracl, we need to look first at the competitive equilibrium when the two parties can only 
trade spot. In this case, after the shock St has been observed agent 1 sells labor on the 
spot market, and agent 2 buys it. 
To avoid confusing individual choices with equilibrium outcomes we will use lower 
case letters to denote the first (i.e. efor agent 1, n, k and c for agent 2) and capitalletters 
to denote the second (L, N, J{ and C). 
For an agent of type 1, labor supply is the solution to the simple problem: 
max v(Ct, T - Rt ) 
subject to : Ct :s T.tVt = Wt . et 
ThC:'" first order eondition eharaeterizing this choiee reduees to: 
(2.1) 
WIDch under the usual non-degeneraey eonditions gives a labor supply function Rt = es (Wt). 
The stockholder solves a more eomplieated problem. Given a pair of initial eonditions 
(So, ko) and a stoehastic sequenee of wage rates {Wt} ~o he has to choose his own labor 
supply nt, the amount oí labor e~ he demands from eaeh of the m agents of type 1, his 
eonsumptionlevel Ct and his investment level it = kt+1 - (1- P, )kt for all periods t = 0, 1, .... 
His stochastic optimal control problem and associated value function can then be written 
as: 
W(So,ko) = 1llBJ[{~6' Lu(Ct,T - "t)P(St,dSt+1)} (2.2) 
subject to : Ct + kt+l = StF(kt, nt, rnet ) + (1 - p,)kt - Wt . mR.t 
Transversality eondition aside, this yields the following array of necessary and sufficient 
first order eonditions, where At denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resouree 
constraint: 
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u1(Ct,T-nt)=At (2.3a) 
U2(Ct, T - nt) = AtStF2(kt, nt, mit) (2.3b) 
St F3(kt ,nt, mit) = Wt (2.3c) 
e5-1 At =¡ At+1 {St+1 F1(kt+l, nt+l, mit+d + (1 - Ji) }P(St, dSt+1)(2.3d) 
A spot-equilibrium is then obtained in two steps: first substitute the labor supply 
function i S ( wd in place of i t in (2.3) and in the resource constraint under1ying (2.2) and 
impose market clearing in the consumption and capital good markets. Then solve the 
system of equations (2.3) to yield a set of functions {w(.), L(·), N(·), C(·), r(.)} depending 
on the state variables Zt = (I{t, St) and such that 
a) m.eS(w(Zt)) = L(Zt) solves (2.1) for aH t = 0,1, ... ;
 
b) Ct = C(Zt), nt = N(Zt), mit = L(Zt), Kt+1 = r(Zt) solve the programmingproblem
 
(2.2) given Wt = w(Zt). 
2.2 Equilibrium with Contracts. 
Begin by defining agent one's reservation utility at time t. This is the minimum total 
utility over the life-time of the contract he will accept at time t when signing a contract 
for the eperiods t + 1, ... , t + e. It will be denoted as Vt. It depends on the state of the 
economy at the encl of periocl t ancl on the expectations this induces about future states. 
Vve can formaHy write it as: 
Vt = Et{¿() V(Ct+i' T - it+i)e5il Zt} = (2.4) 
i=l 
¿ () e5 i ¡ v (W(Zt+i) . .es (w(Zt+ i)) ,T - .es (w(Zt+ i)) ) Q(Zt+i-1' dZt+i) 
i=1 z 
where Z = S x le denotes the set offeasible pairs (Kt, St) and Q(Z, dZ') is the equilibrium 
transitioIl fUllction (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) for the details). Furthermore, 
in (2.4) the notation w(.) indicates the equilibrium wage as a function of the state Z when 
aH workers but one have entered a contractual arrangement. This is the spot-market salary 
----------------------------------,-------------------­
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that an individual worker should expect ií he does not accept the employer's offer but al1 
the other m/8 workers do. It will correspolld to the marginal productivity oí the input 
L evaluated at the level oí L( Zt+i) which is prescribed by the cOlltract alld which wil1 
be deternúned below. The íUllction .es (.) is instead the individual labor supply function 
derived in (2.1). 
When offering a contract the stockholder must take into account the expected utility 
constraint induced by the workers' option oí switchillg to the spot market and therefore 
obtaÍlúng at least Vt. How much utility the non-stockholder should expect from the con­
tract depends on relative bargaining powers. In this papel' we take as a benclunark the 
case in which the proletarians have no bargaining power and al1 the gains from trade are 
col1ected by the capitalists. Obviously this is not completely realistic, but we believe that 
allmving more bargaining power to the workers would not substantial1y change the rela­
tive variability oí wages and hours. We suspect, though that it might have non-negligible 
effects on the cyclical behaviors of capital and labor shares. 
The stockholder decision problem can be described along the fol1owing lines. Given 
the state of the system at the end of period t, Zt = (Kt,St), and conditional on his 
choice of future capital stocks kt+i he needs to offer a contract {W( Zt+¡), L( Zt+i)} r=l 
to his prospective workers and simultaneously make contingent plans as to what kind of 
consumption levels C(Zt+i), labor efforts n(Zt+¡) and investment í(Zt+¡) he will carry out. 
"'hile the overal1 equilibrium values have to be determined at once, here we can examine 
the two problems separately. Let us begin with the contract design problem. 
The implicit c.ontracts literature (see Rosen (1985) íor a survey) teaches that the 
crucial properties of the optimal arrangement depend on the assumptions one is willing to 
make on the different degrees oí risk aversion of firms and workers, on the nature oí the 
available information (public vs. private) and, in certain circumstances, on the income­
elasticity of1eisure for the non-shareholder. This extreme sensitivity of the optimal contract 
generates a large number of outcomes which serve no p~rpose in the present investigation 
and which would be very hard to fol1ow in any case. 
i,From our viewpoint the salient feature oí a contract is that it provides workers with an 
iusurance mechanism during bad periods and entrepreneurs with a source of funds during 
good periods. This property is shared by both public and private information contracts. 
The latter is especial1y relevant only in the study of over- and under-employment of workers 
in (respectively) good 01' bad periods, a topic which does not concern us here (see Chari 
,---
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(1983) and Green and Kahn (1983)). Given that the computational complexity implied 
by the asymmetric information model is orders of magnitude higher than the one implied 
by the public information setup, we have restricted our present analysis to the latter. To 
maintain the analytical treatment within reasonable bounds we also concentrate on the 
special case of one-period ahead contracts (i.e. (} = 1) and leave the exploration of the 
impact of staggered multiperiod contracts for future work (see Horvath (1994)). 
When the realization of the shock is public information, wages and employment can be 
made conditionaljust on S. A contract is then a pair offunctions {W(S),L(S) = m·.e(S)} 
maximizing the capitalist 's expected utility subject to the constraint that each agent of 
type 1 has an expected utility no less than his reservation utility Vt as defined in (2.4). 
For the time being let the equilibrium values of Ct+1, NH1 , ]{t+l and ]{t+2 be taken 
parametrically by the capitalist. The optimal contract solves: 
max f U(CHh T - NHl)P(St,dSH I) (2.5) 
W(-),L(-) ls 
subject to: 1V(W(SHI), T - .e(SHl)) P(St, dSt+I) 2:: Vt 
O~ Ct+l ~ SI+l F(Kt+1,NH1 , L(SHI)) + (1 - ¡.¡,)KH1 - ]{H2 - m· W(SHl) 
It is well known (see e.g. Hart and Holmstrom (1987)), that the unique optimal 
contract is fully chara:,terized by the following three conditions: 
m . Ul (Ct+1 , T - NH1 )SHl F3(]{Hl, NH1 , Lt+1) = 7]Hl V2(WH1 ,T - .et+1) (2.6a) 
m . Ul (CH1 , T - NH1 ) = '7Hl VI (WH1 ,T - .eH1) (2.6b)1V(lVt+1,T - Rt+1)P(St, dSHI) 2:: Vt (2.6c) 
where '7t+l is the Lagrange multiplier on the expected utility constraint and the dependence 
of W and Ron St+1 has been omitted to economize on space. 
The properties of the contract are straightforward and willnot be repeated here. For 
our purposes it will suffice to stress that the risk-sharing condition (2.6b) is generally not 
satisfied by the spot-equilibrium allocation. The contract in fact allows the entrepreneur 
one extra degree of freedom: the ratio between his marginal utility of consumption and 
the worker's marginal utility of consumption willnow be equal to the constant 7]t+l in all 
states while in the spot economy that same ratio only satisfies 
U1(CH1 ,T-Nt+1) _ U2(Ct+1,T-Nt+1) F3 (]{Hl,Nt+1,mR(St+I)) 
VI (W(St+1)' T - .e(St+l)) - V2(W(SHI), T - R(St+1)) X F2(I{Hl, Nt+1,m.e(St+1)) 
-------------------------;---------------------­
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which needs not be constant with respect to St+1 E S. 
A second implication of (2.6), has to do with the sensitivity of W(·) with respeet to 
St for any given ]{t. As noted in Rosen (1985) for the case in which u is linear, only 
when workers' preferences are completely separable in consumption and leisure the opti­
mal contract predicts that workers' and entrepreneurs' consumptions should be perfectIy 
correlated across states of the world, whereas a non separable v(·, .) links consumption 
behavior and the employment level of workers. In our own application the utility function 
is not linear, and we have not observed any relevant difference in this regard between the 
behavior of the separable lllodel described below and that of a non-separable version we 
have also silllulated. 
Denote with W*(·),L*(·) the equilibriulll solution to (2.6) as a function of the state 
and of the other equilibriulll variables. Dnder the assulllption that aH entrepreneurs are the 
sallle, cOlllpetition in the lllarket for contracts guarantees that in equilibriulll the latter will 
be identical across firllls. The envelope theorelll justifies our use of equilibriulll notation 
when studying the dynamic progralllllling problelll of the representative capitalist: 
(') ..,)_./ 
subject to: Ct + kt+1 ::; StF(kt,nt,L*(.)) + (1- p)kt - kt+1 - mW*(·) 
Dnder standard restrictions (see e.g. Stokey and Lucas (1989, Chapt. 9)) (2.7) 1S 
known to possess a unique solution, sUllllllarized by the policy function kt+1 = T( kt ;St, 1(t). 
The latter is continuous in kt and ]{t for any given St. A characterization of the (inte­
rior) optilllal choices of the entrepreneur can be obtained by lookillg at the transversality 
conditioll and at the first order conditions 
U1(Ct, T - nt) = At (2.8a) 
u2(Ct,T-nt) = AtSt F2(kt,nt,L*) (2.8b) 
8-1At = 1At+dSt+1 F1(kt+1,nt+1,L*)+(1-p)]P(St,dSt+d (2.8c) 
where At denotes once again the Lagrange lllultiplier associated with the technological 
constraint in (2.7). 
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A competitive equilibrium for the contract economy is then routinely defined by the 
existence of a set of functions W*(·), L*(·), C(·), N(·) and r(.) depending on the state 
vector Zt = (St, J{t) and such that: 
a) W*(·) and L*(·) solve (2.5) for aH Zt given C(·), N(·) and r(·); 
b) C(·), N(.) and r(.) solve (2.7) for aH Zt given W"'(·), L"'(·). 
2.9 Bargaining Power 
The formulation given in (2.5) of the way in which the contractual agreements are 
reachecl, implicitely assumes that aH the bargaining power rests with the capitalists anci 
that the proletarians walk away from the labor contract room with the same expeeted 
utility they carriecl when they walked in. Qne l1lay indeed think of situations in which 
agents of type 1 have some l1larket power anci are therefore able to obtain more than their 
reservation utili ty. 
This needs not destroy the efficiency properties of the optimal contract, which can be 
reaclily interpreted as the outcome of a Pareto efficient aHocation where the two parties 
are given weights clifferent from those implicit in (2.5). A simple way of forl1lalizing this 
approach is to repIace (2.5) with the foHowing problem. Given the state vector Zt = 
(St, J{t) ancl the equilibrium values of Nt and J{t+l: 
(2.9) 
suhject to: O~ Ct ~ S'F(I<t,Nt,L) +(1- p)J{t - J{t+l - mW 
The parameter l/t E [0,1] is chosen arbitrarily and it is a measure of the degree of market 
power of the entrepreneur. By varying l/t between O and 1, we can trace out the whole 
expected utility possibility frontier. It is readily seen that by setting 71t in (2.5) equal to 
(1 - l/t)/I/t in (2.9) the two problems hecome identica1. 
It is tempting to ask if different choices of 1/t might have quantitatively relevant impli­
cations for the equilibrium behavior of the labor market variables. Taking our framework 
seriously yields an upper (17) anci a lower Cl!.) hound. The first is assoeiated with guarantee­
ing that the solution to (2.9) provides the workers with the same level of expected utility 
they receive under the spot-equilibrium while the latter guarantees to the entrep"reneurs 
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theil' expected utility under the spot arrangements. An analysis along this line is not per­
fonned here. Unreported simulations suggest that, for reasonable values of v, the results 
would be insignificantIy different from those reported later in Seetion 3. 
We have also studied the behavior of our economy in the presence of a contractual 
arrangement under which the proletarians are guaranteed a constant level of utility in 
each future state of the world. This constant utility level has been chosen to be equal to 
their expeeted utility in the spot-equilibrium. It is rather obvious that this contract is 
not optimal in the Pareto sense: both parties could be made better-off by trading some 
ullcertaillty. 
Let Vt be defined as in (2.4) above. Let g(vt,.e(St)) solve 
(2.10) 
The funetion g(.) always exists and is well defined under standard restrictions. The con­
tractual problem replacing (2.5) can then be written as 
(2.11 ) 
The optimal contract is fully characterized by the first order condition 
(2.12) 
vVith the obvious substitutions the remaining choice variables of the entrepreneur ancI the 
equilibrium functions can then be determined as in subseetion 2.2. 
Economic intuition and the formal results reported in Green and Kahn (1983) suggest 
that one should observe smaller fiuctuations in Lt and larger fiuctuations in Wt under 
the contract specified in (2.11) thall under the optimal cOlltract (2.5). As our simulations 
reveal this is also the case in the fully parameterized model. Given that this is, on the 
other hand, the only way in which the introduction of the suh-optimal contract affects the 
model economy we do not report the results hel'e. 
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3. The Parametric Models. 
In this section we introduce the specific functional forms utilized in the exercise and 
charaeterize the most intuitive properties of the equilibria. 
The produetion funetion has been chosen to be Cobb-Douglas in capital (K) and 
total labor (E), while the latter is a CES combination of proletarians and capitalists work 
efforts. 
v S }'-C\'E 1-C\'
.lt= t'\.t t (3.1) 
pEt = (aNi + (1 - a)Ln 1/ 
Here L = nd. is the total amount of proletarian labor employed. The parameters Q and 
a are in the unit interval, while p is assumed negative to refiect the complementarity in 
proeluction between the two types of labor. 
The time-separable utility functions for both agents have been chosen from the C.E.S. 
class, uneler the restriction that the worker should be more risk averse than the en­
trepreneur. The latter has a utility function given by 
1 l-ljJ 'Y ( )l-ljJUt = --Ct +-- T-nt (3.2)1- 'ljJ 1- 'ljJ 
As for the utility function of proletarians we have experimented with both separable (in 
consumption anel leisure) and non-separable ones but observed very small and altogether 
not significant differences for the behavior of the contraet economy. We will therefore 
report only the results for the separable version, which is 
_ 1 -1-0' + () (T IJ )1-0'Vt - --C -- - {·t (3.3)1-a 1-a 
Obviously a > 'ljJ is to be assumed throughout the rest of the papero The technological 
shock St follows the stochastic process 
St+1 = Si' exp((zt), Zt '" N(O, 1) (3.4) 
with Ps E (0,1) ancl ( > O. 
It shoulcl be noted that the utility functions specified are not consistent with balancecl 
growth in ouptut, consumption, ancl investment ullder exogenous produetivity growth (see 
King, Plosser, ancl Rebelo (1988)). We choose to abanclon the class of funetions non­
separable in consumption ancl leisure which are consistellt with balancecl growth because 
- ...._....._--_._--------------,------,---------------------­
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they yield an undesireable property: In the spot economy, worker labor hours are constant 
given that the worker consumes his income each periodo Hours worked in the contract 
economy are little affected by the choice of functional class. However, relative to what 
obtains in the spot economy the choice of non-separable utility would make the contract 
economy seem too good for the wrong reason. 
As in most RBC models, the functional forms assume that the intratemporal e1as­
ticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to both the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution between utility today and utility tomorrow and the e1asticity of 
substitution across states of nature or one over the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
It is apparent from microeconomic estimates of the relevant elasticity parameters (see 
Kilingsworth (1983)) that this may be an unrealistic assumption. 
However, in light of our desire to compare the results of simulations from om model 
with those of previous RBC models, we proceed with the functional fonns described above. 
The present model differs from the standard approach in that we allow the elasticities to 
vary across agent types: capitalist and proletarian and we want to isolate the effect this has 
on thlO' model's behavior. Adding additional degrees offreedom by enhancing the parameter 
space to allow for differences within agent types in the elasticities of substitution would be 
an interesting extension of the present analysis. 
S.l Characterization 01 the Eqnilibrium. 
ThlO' proletarians labor supply under spot market conditions is 
(3.5) 
where e== (jI /(1. Notice that (j < 1 is required to avoid a backward bending labor supply 
function. Hence we will always assume O < 'ljJ < (j' < 1. The first order conditions 
characterizing the solution to (2.7) are given by 
Ct-I/J == At (3.6a) 
,(T - 1it)-t/) == a(l - a)StKfE¡-Ct-pNi- I (3.6b) 
8- 1 At == ¡ At+I(aSt+IK~-;I Ei.+t +1- ¡.l)P(St,dSt+I) (3.6c) 
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The optimal contrad {W*, L*} and the "bargaining power multiplier" tJt are computed 
by means of 
(3.7a) 
(3.7b) 
(3.7c) 
where the subscript spot indicates the equilibrium values associated to the labor supply 
function (3.5) and the notation M Pt stands for 
Algebraic manipulation of the systems (3.6) and (3.7) yields useful insights into some 
basic properties of our dynamie contract economy. The total payments to an individual 
worker are 
(3.8) 
Denoting with Wspot the real wage of proletarians in the spot economy and with W the 
same real wage in the contraet economy it is easy to see that 
Wspot (jf 
----;;;- = T - f 
Hence during periods in which individual effort is higher than normal the spot wage will 
tenc1 to be above the contract wage while the opposite occurs during periods in which R is 
belowaverage. It is apparent from (3.7) that f is procyclical. A comparison of (3.7a) with 
the first order condition determining the spot market labor supply function (3.5) shows 
that in the spot economy the level of employment reacts less to variations in its marginal 
productivity than in the contrad economy due to the presence of a wealth effect which is 
altogether absent in (3.7a). 
9.2 Parameterization. 
The system of equations we use to compute the dynamic equilibria of the model de­
pends on a set of thirteen parameters. Four pertain to the aggregate technology (O', p, a, 1',), 
two are needed to specify the stochastic process for the technological shock (Ps, (), a graup 
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of five define the preferences of the agents (0", B, 1/;, ¡, Ó) and the last two quantify the 
total time endowment and its distribution among capitalist and proletarians (T, m). Fol­
Iowing along the methodology of Kydland and Prescott (1982) we will now describe the 
numerical vaIues we used and the empirical support for our choices. 
For sorne of them the restrictions imposed by our model are indistinguishable from 
those imposed by the standard RBC models. Finding nothing objeetionable in the standard 
calibration procedure we have just adopted those same values. This choice sets Ó = .993, 
JI = .028 and T = 1369 which is the totalnumber of non-sleeping hours per average person, 
per quarter. 
The calibration of the remaining technology parameters is not a completely straight­
forward matter. The problem originates from our definition of the labor input E as a CES 
cOlllbination of the two types of time efforts, L and N. Unfortunately we lack indepen­
dent observations on these two variables. We considered for a moment the hypothesis of 
adopting the c1assification supervisory vs. non-supervisory work as a possible empirical 
proxy. Nevertheless we chose not to considel' this source of information on the ground that 
it provides a very bad and narrow representation of those aggregates to which our model 
refers. GOllune and Greenwood (1993) faced a similar problem ancI we share their agnostic 
c.onc1usions. The most reasonable option is therefore to treat total hours as a measure of 
E and proceed along. 
With this caveat and the chosen values of Ó and /1 one can proceed at estimating the 
technology paramete1' Q' independenUy from p aJld a. We have applied staJldard GMM 
procedures to the orthogonality restriction induced by the Euler condition (3.6c) which 
uniquely depends 011 Q' (see appendix A for data sources). Our point estimate Q' = .26 
differs substantial1y from the value of Q' = .36 usual1y adopted in the RBC literature 
but most of the difference seems attributable to ou1' choice of the percentage change in 
the S&P500 index as an instrument for the entrepreneurs' marginal rate of intertemporal 
substitution in consumption. As the appropriateness of this choice is predicated on the 
empirical relevance of the consumption-based CAPM and the latter is at least debatable 
we have also simulated our model with Q' = .36 and the sample statistics turn out to chaJlge 
only slighUy. To avoid giving the impression that our results depend upon this particular 
estimate we have used an average between the two values, i.e. for the baseline model we 
have set Q' = .31 . To facilitate compariso11 we have also chosen to report the outcomes of 
our simulations for both Q' = .26 and Q' = .36 in appendix B. 
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As for the substitutability parameter p, lacking compelling empirical evidence on the 
matter, we have nevertheless found acceptable the idea that entrepreneurs and their em­
ployees are slightIy complementary and not substitutable production factors, at least at the 
business cycle frequencies with which this study is concerned. The latter requires p to be 
negative but not too much so, and we have experimented with a few values in the interval 
[-1.0, -.1], without noticing any relevant impact on the final outcomes. Very bizarre re­
sults obviously can be obtained at extreme values of p when the degree of complementarity 
between the two types of labor becomes exageratedly large. 
Given that T has been set equal to 1369 we next turn to the determination of how 
many proletarians are out there for each capitalist. The theoretical underpinnings of 0'1.11' 
framework together with the empirical evidence quoted in the introcluction suggest that 
somewhere between one-quarter and four-fifths of the population should be conside1'ed as 
composecl of stockholders implying that m lies in the interval [.25,3]. However, we can 
restriet attention to a smaller set of plausible parameter values by contrasting the meaning 
of the pa1'ameter to 0'1.11' model with the intent of the empirical evidence. In our model, 
the number of workers relative to the total population is defined as the fraction of agents 
for whom consumption equals income. Compared with this definition, the definition of 
"liquiclity constrained" used in the micro-Ievel studies is not sufficientIy inclusive since 
it only counts as workers those individuals who in the past have had credit denied to 
them. This understates the munber of "workers" in the economy if there exist individuals 
who have not had eonsumption loans deniecl to them but nevertheless consume all their 
income each periocl. On the other hand, the evidence in Mankiw ancl Zeldes (1991) may 
be too inclusive with respeet to what our model is trying to capture since they only count 
as entrepreneurs people who own stocks in publicly traded corporations. This overstates 
the number of "workers" if there exist people who do not own stocks in corporations 
but, nevertheless, own buffer stocks of capital in the fonn of houses, cars, privately held 
corporations, et cetera. 
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) present empirical evidence which suggests the fraction 
of workers whose consumption growth follows ineome growth is around one-half. In a 
stochastic environment we may not expeet that "workers" (in the sense of the model's 
clefinition) are always able to consume their income every periodo This motivates us to 
accept a definition of workers as individuals for whom consumption growth follows income 
growth at business cycle frequencies and, for the purpose of parameterizing the' mocle1, 
" 
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we focus on the macroeconomic evidence in Campbel1 and Mankiw (1989). To hopeful1y 
satisfy our critics, we also perform sensitivity checks to assure that any positive results 
are not achieved through critical parameter choices. While results seem to change little as 
.5 ~ m ~ 2, a number of sample statistics become very sensitive for values of m > 2 01' 
m < .5. For this reason and also in order not to bias our calibration too heavily toward the 
hypothesis that a very large portion of the population is the worker-type we have chosen 
the value m = 1.5 for our baseline model. 
Once a value of m is chosen one can use income distribution data to fix the remaining 
techll010gical parameter a. The idea is that of chosing a so that the steady state portion 
of income going to the employees corresponds to the sample percentage of national income 
received by the bot tom sixty percent of the population (the fraction sixty percent is implieel 
by the choice of m = 1.5). Although the concentration of wealth evidenced in the elata 
does not imply credit constraints for the pOOl' but not the rich, the empirical evidence 
indicates a strong negative correlation between wealth and the presence of such constraints 
(see Attanasio (1994)). Whether causal 01' not, this evidence has motivated us to specify 
a model in which the poorer group eloes not own capital stocks. Therefore, this is the 
manner in which we must interpret the evielence on the distribution of wealth, absent any 
micro evidence on the distribution of wealth for the two types of individuals. 
Depending on measurement techinques and various possible definitions of income, the 
values we have founel in the literature for the percentage of income accruing to the bottom 
60% of the population range between .30 and .36. As a point estimate we have chosen .33 
which is the value reported for the United States in World Bank (1993, p. 297). In our 
model, though, the steaely state income elistribution is also affecteel by the elegrees of risk 
aversion of the two agents anel by the intensity of their preferences for leisure. A reasonable 
choice of a must therefore be maele jointly with that of the preferences parameters, to which 
we move next. 
Two of them (e and 1) can be calibrateel so that the model deterministic steady state 
satisfies some empirica1 restrictions on the typica1 fraction of total non-sleeping hours that 
inclividuals al10cate to market activities. It is customary in the business cycle literature to 
use point estimates between .25 and .33 for this fraction which in general require values 
between .9 anel 1.3 for the model's parameters. As for (J' and 'l/J they are in some sense 
"free'" in our model and are meant to capture the extent to which workers are more risk 
averse than entrepreneurs. After experimenting with a few non-extreme values we have 
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observed that relatively little variations occur for (j between .3 and .9. and '!/J between .2 
and .6. It should be noted that in our framework a value of 1 is in any case an upper 
bound for both degrees of risk aversion as larger values would imply a backward bending 
spot-Iabor supply function, hardly a realistic feature at the business cycle frequencies we 
are interested in studying. 2 
Still this leaves us with a large set of parameter values from which to make our choice. 
To restrict it further we have concentrated on two particularly important sample statistics: 
the correlations between wages and output and between consumption and output. The 
V.S. data reported in the introduction suggest a low value for the first and a relatively high 
value for the second. Sensitivity analysis shows that in our model their behavior depends 
in a nonlinear fashion on the choice of a, (j and '!/J (varying (} and "Y appropriately in order 
to match the sample statistics on the percentage of total hours spent at work). 
Fig. 1.1 Sensitivity of <7w/<7Y Fig 1.2 Sensitivity of <7w/<7Y Fig 1.3 Sensitivity of <7w/<7Y 
0-.46 0-.50 0-.54 
In order to characterize such dependence begin by considering Figures 1.1-1.3, report­
ing the real wage standard deviation as a fraction of the output standard deviation for 
different values of a, (j and d = - '!/J. The height of the surfaces in the graphs, read(j 
off the vertical axis, correspond to the ratio of (jw to (j y calculated by simulations of the 
model for varying values of the parameters (j, d, and a. 
2 Previous RBC models have typicaJly specified a degree oí risk aversion larger than unity, motivated largely 
by the inconsistency of lower degrees oí risk aversion with empiricaJly observed high levels of intertemporal 
substitution. For the reasons described aboye, the contract economy does not require excess risk aversion to 
match this feature of the data. 
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The ratio first decreases and then increases in d, with the location of the minimum 
points occurring at higher values of d as u and a increase. The figures suggest that 
the smoothest wages occur not when the amount of insurance desired by the workers is 
extremely high but instead when it is moderately high. Furthermore as the workers become 
more risk averse the smoothest wages occur when their relative barganing position worsens 
(higher d). Final1y, as a increases the volatility of wages relative to output becomes more 
sensitive to the value of u and less sensitive to the value of d. 
FíO. 2.1 Sensitivity of rrh/rry Fio 2.2 Sensitivity of ah/ay Fio 2.3 Sensitivity of ah/rry 
0-.46 0-.50 0-.54 
To explain the convex shape ofthe surfaces in Figures 1.1-1.3, consider Figures 2.1-2.3 
showing that the relative volatility of hours is nearly linearly increasing in d but lineady 
decreasing in u. Recal1 that the contract tends to smooth out W t , the total wage bill and 
that the aggregate real wage is obtained by averaging Wt/L t with the marginal productivity 
of the entrepreneurs' hours. As d increases the volatility of Lt increases as it becomes more 
correlated with output. This tends to compensate for .the correlation of Wt with output 
thereby redueing the volatility of Wt with respect to that of output. But as d increases 
the volatility of Wt also keeps increasing until it outdoes that of Lt thereby pushing up 
the relative volatility of Wt again. This logic implies that at low and increasing values of 
d the real wage should be more highly correlated with output than at very high values of 
d. This is confirmed in Figures 3.1-3.3 where wages are less correlated with output as d 
increases, as u decreases, ancl final1y as a decreases. 
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Fill. J.1 Sensitillity o, aw-y Fill. J.1 Sensitill¡ty o, aw-y Fill. J.1 Sensitillity o, aw-y 
0-.46 Q-.~O Q_.~4 
Fig. 4.1 Sensitillity o, ac-y Fig. 4.1 Sensitillity o, ac-y Fill. 4.1 Sensitillity o, ac-y 
0=.46 Q-.~O Q-.~4 
In Figures 3.1-3.3 and 4.1-4.3 we have reported the simulated correlations between 
Wt and Yt and between Ct and Yt as mesh surfaces above the (j ,d planeo The outlined 
planar sul'faces drawn in aH figures indicate the estimated values for the statistics from 
the U.S. data sample. In both sets of figures the mesh surfaces slice through the planes 
denoting the empirical point estimates for a range of values for (j and d. The reader will 
note that for values of a = .46 one can get close to both planes for choices of (j = .32 01' .34 
and d = .1 01' .12. Further simulations (not reported) show that this is the case for even 
lower values of a. These findings have led us to set our baseline parameter values equal 
to a = .46, (j = .32 and 'l/J = .22. As we mentioned before, lacking direct observations, the 
l'easonableness of these choices can be judged only ex-post by the quality of the ovel'aH 
model's performances. On a-priori ground we find them perfectly acceptable. 
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Finally the two parameters oí the stochastic process St have been estimated by con­
structing a "Solow residual" series in the ordinary way. The latter has been used to com­
pute GMM estimators íor the autocorrelation parameter ps while ( has been obtained by 
applaying GMM to the orthogonality restriction on the innovations oí Sto This procedure 
gives the two values Ps = .968 and ( = .010. 
While these are typical oí parameter values used in other RBC simulation excercises, 
it was noted above how the dynamic response oí the contract model is heightened by the 
existence oí the contract between workers and entrepreneurs. Thereíore, the same size 
innovations to log-productivity will have a larger instantaneous impact in the contract 
economy than in its spot counterpart. Alternately, the contract model requires smaller 
shocks than the spot eeonomy to match the volatility oí output. The interpretation oí a 
"Solow residual" innovation in the contract model is the same as in the standard RBC 
literature: an exogenous change in the productivity oí all íactors oí production. The 
interpretation oí the output innovation that íollows the productivity innovation is differ­
ent. The output innovation is comprised oí two parts, one associated with the change in 
procluctivity, the other associatecl with the contractual nature oí worker-firm re1ationships. 
Table 2 - Baseline Values of Calibratioll Parameters. 
h = .993 (j = .32 'ljJ = .22 1=1.075 (j = 1.195 Il = .028 
O' = .31 p = -.7 a =.46 Ps = .968 (= .01 m = 1.5 
9.3	 Simulation Re$ult$. 
Using the set oí parameter values listed in Table 2 we have generated 100 samples oí 
artificial economies with 180 observations each. The data so obtainecl were passecl through 
the H-P :filter ancl the results were averagecl over the 100 saIuples. 
Most oí the results reported below appear quite robust to paraInetric variations and 
are very indicative oí the ability oí the model to capture some oí the business cycle puzzles 
we discussed in the introduction. In particular three claims we have made seems to be 
consistent with the behavior oí this artificial economy 
1.	 Introclucing a eontract increases the volatility oí hours ancl clecreases that oí real 
hourly wages. 
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2.	 The volatility of aggregate output is increased together with those of profits and the 
labor-share. The last two also display the correct sign for output correlation. 
3.	 The correlation of wages and output can be reduced to almost zero (in fact at other 
acceptable parameter values it turns out be slightly negative) while hours remain 
strongly correlated with output. 
Table 3 - Baseline Model. 
Series	 Sto D. Corro Autocorr. 
Output	 2.82 1.00 .725 
Consumption	 0.94 0.71 .607 
Investment	 8.71 0.93 .728 
Hours	 2.28 0.97 .739 
Avg. Lah. Prod.	 0.56 0.94 .657 
Real Wage	 0.31 0.41 -.084 
Labor Share	 0.50 -0.88 .798 
Profits	 3.87 0.96 .778 
The performances of the model are also encouraging with respect to the first order
 
autocorre1ation of the aggregate variables, but not entirely so. As Table 3 shows, the high
 
persistence that caracterizes the real wage in the post sec.ond world war data is not dis­

played by our model under H-P filtering. If one takes into consideration the asymptotic
 
standard errors of the sample estimate the hypothesis that this autoc.orrelation is aetu­

ally zero cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. In any case, even a zero
 
autocorrelation remains a far cry from the empirically observed values. Similar statistics
 
are usually not provided for standard RBC models, but simulations we have run using a
 
standard RBC model show that these features are common to both frameworks.
 
On the other hand one should stress that the lack of persistence in real wages lS
 
relatively easy to eliminate in the contractual framework. It is induced by the fact that
 
our contracts are only one-period-ahead and do not link workers ancl entrepreneurs for
 
more than one quarter. This enables the two parties to quickly incorporate changes in
 
aggregate productivity in the calculation of labor compensations.
 
....__..._~---------------,----------~------------~~-----
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Indeed this is a very unrealistic feature of the model, which we have chosen to main­
tain here only because it great1y simplifies the numerical computations. Simulations of 
a simplified version of the contract model allowing for staggered multi-period contracts 
lasting three to five quarters are presented in Horvath (1994). They show that this modi­
fication loosens the short-run relation between changes in marginal productivity and real 
wages resulting in positive autocorrelation of measured real wages and, consequently, of 
the consumption series. 
The model performs quite well in all the other dimensions and when standard errors 
are taken into account the empirical sample estimates (with the noted exception of the 
real wages autocorrelation coefficient) belong to the confidence intervals generated by the 
artificial economy and viceversa. Results are even stronger when the model and data are 
rendered stationary with a log-linear trencl with single breakpoint in 1973:1. Simulation 
results for log-linear detrending amI first-differeneing filters are available upon request. 
A quantitative feeling of the way in which the optimal eontraet affeets the perfor­
mances of the artifieial eeonomy ean be gaugecl by comparing the sample statisties for the 
contraetual model with those of the spot-eeonomy. This is done in Table 4 for the standard 
deviation, output correlation, and uneonditional first autocorrelation of the H-P filterecl 
data. All parameter values are as in Table 3. 
Table 4 - Contract vs. Spot Economy, H·P Filter. 
Contract Model Spot Model 
Series Sto D. Corro Autoeorr. Sto D. Corro AutocolT. 
Output 2.82 1.00 .725 2.71 1.00 .701 
Consumption 0.94 0.71 .607 1.23 0.71 .870 
Investment 8.71 0.93 .728 11.57 0.92 .675 
Hours 2.28 0.97 .739 2.11 0.96 .690 
Avg. Lab. ProcD.56 0.94 .657 0.63 0.94 .752 
Real Vvage 0.31 0.41 -.084 0.68 0.95 .740 
Labor Share 0.50 -0.88 .798 0.00 0.00 .000 
Profits 3.87 0.96 .778 2.71 0.97 .701 
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Our last comparison is between the contract model and the Hansen (1985) "indivisible 
labor" model, which is correctly regarded as the paradigmatic RBC model of labor mar­
ket behavior (see also Rogerson (1988) for the theoretical background). Hansen did not 
consider factor shares, nor autocorrelation coefficients. Table 5 is constructed aceordingly. 
The parameter values for our model are those of Table 3 and 4. 
Table 5 - Contraet Econorny and Hansen (1985) Econorny. 
Contract Model Hansen (1985) Model 
Series Stand. Dev. Correlation Stand. Dev. Correlation 
Output 2.82 1.00 1.76 1.00 
Consumption 0.94 0.71 0.51 0.87 
Investment 8.71 0.93 5.71 0.99 
Hours 2.28 0.97 1.35 0.98 
Avg. Lab. Proclo 0.56 0.94 0.50 0.87 
Real Wage 0.31 0.41 
­
Labor Share 0.50 -0.88 -
Profits 3.87 0.96 
- -
It is fair to conclucle that there is no visible dimension along which the eontract moclel 
performs worse ancl some obvious and very important dimensions along which it performs 
better. 
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4. Conclusions 
We have shown that introducing simple forms of contraetuallabor relationships in a 
standard stochastic optimal growth model makes it display more realistic properties than 
those that obtain when the labor market is modeled in a purely Walrasian fashion. Wages 
and hours oscillate at the right magnitude and in the right direction without the need of 
introducing an unreasonably elastic labor supply function or "unobservable" institutional 
mechanisms. Factor share cyclical variability and correlation can be accounted for by the 
same contractual argument which also provides an explanation for the observed behavior 
of profits and investments at the peak and trough of the trade cycles. 
Faetor share oscillations, while going in the right direction, are still relatively small in 
our model. This is espeeially true for profits. This seems harder to capture: it may require 
moving away from a Cobb-Douglas specification for the aggregate technology as well as 
from the one-sector representation. Two-seetor Cobb-Douglas models already allow for 
cyclical variations in faetor shares; it needs to be seen if they are quantitatively relevant. 
Along these lines one may also consider further departures from the purely competitive 
framework, such as the introduction of borrowing contractual arrangements between ell­
trepreneurs and financial institutions. 
It shoulcl be stressecl that the borrowing constraints imposed on the workers in the 
moclel are extreme. However, the behaviour of the model would be similar if workers were 
allowed to borrow on expeetations of future income streams up to a lil11it, as long as the 
lil11it was a binding eonstraint in each periodo 
This line of research could icleally leacl us to be able to dispense with the notion 
of large and frequent, aggregate technological shocks. They are very vague and hardly 
l11easurable entities, which can be identified only after the fact by accepting uncritically a 
number of simplifications on the forl11 of the production funetion and on the way in which 
inputs are rewarded. The theory of the business cycle which stel11S from dynal11Íc. general 
equilibrium models does not require aggregate shocks, neither from a logicalnor frol11 an 
empirical point of view as del110nstrated in Horvath (1993). Their current adoption seel11S 
to be 1110tivated almost essentially by practical eonsiderations: lacking endogenous sources 
of instability and built-in magnifiers one has to resort to aggregate exogenous stil11uli "to 
get things going". Further investigation in this area may well point to other endogenous 
sourcesof business fluetuations. 
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Another natural extension is to look at the asset pricing implications oí the contractual 
approach. Results obtained with a model in which non stockholders are the only suppliers 
oí labor effort are quite promising. Intuitively this is due to a couple oí íactors. On one 
hand, as our model shows, profit earners now bear a much larger portion oí the aggregate 
risk: return on equities is both much higher and more correlated with aggregate output. 
On the other hand the equilibrium prices oí assets are not evaluated by using aggregate 
consumption to compute the relevant rate oí intertemporal substitution. Instead it is 
the consumption oí stockholders alone that matters and the latter need not be as stahle 
and sl1100th as the econol11Y's average consul11ption. In order to give operative content 
to this approach to asset pricing, one needs to be able to identiíy empirical l11easures oí 
stockholder's consul11ption volatility. 
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Appendix A: Data description 
We have attempted to present statistics on and estimate parameters from data on 
private sector, non-farm, business production and factor payments. To do so, we often 
begin with a broader category and subtract sectors which we do not wish to include (eg., 
removillg farm production from gross domestic product). In the list below, the series name 
is followed by the symbol which corresponds to the series in our model. A brief description 
of the data source is given with specific series abbreviations and, in some cases, additional 
notes. 
Output = Y. Real gross national product less the production of farm, non-farm housing, 
and government sectors, in 1982 dollars, reported quarterIy in Citibase National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA): gnd82-gpbf82-gbuh82-ggnp82. AH data have been season­
aHy adjusted. 
Consumption = e + W, Real total consumer expenditure on non-durables and services, in 
1982 dollars, reported quarter1y in Citibase NIPA: gcn82+gcs82.
 
Investment = l. Real private sector, fixed, non-residential investment plus real expenditure
 
on consumer durables, in 1982 dollars, reported quarterIy in Citibase NIPA: gin82+gccl82.
 
Capital Stock = K. Stock of investment series constructed in the usual manner by com­

paring net and gross investment series. Source: Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990).
 
Total Hours Worked= L + N. Total hours worked in non-farm, business sector (index=100
 
in 1982), basecl on establishment surveys, reportecl quarterIy by Bureau of Labor Statistics:
 
LBMNU.
 
Real v.,Tages == (W + MPN x N)/(L + N). Hourly compensation of aH non-farm, business
 
employees (index=100 in 1982), basecl on establishment surveys, reported quarterIy by
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics: LBCPU, defiated by the variable defined below as Price.
 
Profit = y - W - MPN x N. Nominal corporate profits before tax reportecl quarterIy in
 
Citibase NIPA: gpbt, defiatecl by the variable defined below as Price.
 
Average Labor Productivity = Y/(L + N).
 
Labor Share = (W + MPN x N)/Y.
 
Price : Implicit price clefiator equal to nominal output series (NIPA: gncl-gpbf-gbuh-ggnp)
 
divided by the real output series clescribecl aboye under Output.
 
----- --:--_____________r-1 
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Detrending Methods: We induce stationarity by three alteruate methods 
(only the results for H-P filtering are reported 
in the text): a two-trend detrending procedure on the log-levels of the data, the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with A, the cost of detrending in the filter's minimization function, 
set at 1600, and log first-differencing. The latter method is completely straightforward. 
The log-linear detrending allows for one trend in the log-levels from 1947-1972, and a 
potential1y different trend from 1973-1990. Natural1y, the log-linear detrending removes 
less information than the HP-filtering, however, questions remain whether the classical 
properties apply to the distribution of the log-linearly detrended series because they may 
still not be covariance stationary. 
--~-~~-----------------,-------------------------
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Appendix B: Alternative Parameter Values. 
To complete the description of the baseline model's performances we report next the 
sample statistics for the case in which Q' = .26 and Q' = .36. Al! other parameter values 
are as in Tables 3 and 4 with the fol!owing exceptions. In both cases, r and (j have been 
adjusted to keep the appropriate ratio between working and nonsleeping hours. Also, 
in Table B.2 we have chosen slightly different values for a, (j and 'l/J (holding d = (j - 'l/J 
constant) in order to match the sample correlations between wages and output and between 
consumption and output. These new values are: a = .42, (j = .38 and 'l/J = .28. No change 
of this kind was made for Q' = .26 even if also in that case some very smal! variations of 
the same parameters would have allowed us to exactly match the named correlations. 
---~------------------------------------------,------' 
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Table B.l - Contract Model (o = .26, e= 1.04, l' = .925) 
Series Sto D. Corro Autocorr. 
Output 2.92 1.00 .601 
Consumption 1.33 0.86 .552 
lnvestment 10.22 0.93 .587 
Hours 2.26 0.97 .612 
Avg. Lab. Prod. 0.68 0.95 .565 
Real Vvage 0.51 0.88 .288 
Labor Share 0.30 -0.83 .655 
Profits 3.68 0.96 .661 
Table B.2 - Contract Model (o = .36, e= .97, l' = .903) 
Series Sto D. Corro Autocorr. 
Output 2.44 1.00 .720 
Consumption 0.71 0.76 .489 
lnvestment 6.03 0.95 .727 
Hours 1.91 0.97 .741 
Avg. Lab. Prod. 0.55 0.95 .632 
Real Wage 0.30 0.40 -.128 
Labor Share 0.50 -0.89 .804 
Profits 3.29 0.96 .769 
-_._.._.. ----------------,------------------- ----­
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